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Roberts: Roberts: We Didn't Know Any Better Defense:

The "We Didn't Know Any Better" Defense:
The Eighth Circuit's View of
Qualified Immunity for Jail Officers
Who Detain Arrestees
Hill v. McKinley'

I. INTRODUCTION
In the early morning hours of August 18, 1996, Robin Hill found herself
strapped to a table, face down, spread-eagled, and completely naked, in full view
of the guards at the jail where she was being held for public intoxication. If this
is a constitutional violation, then what is the remedy? At first glance, it would
appear that Congress has given Hill a cause of action against her captors for
violation of her Fourth Amendment right to privacy. About a half-century ago,
however, the Supreme Court imparted old common-law immunity to lawenforcement officers in actions for violations of constitutional rights. This
immunity has since evolved into a form that calls for no consideration
whatsoever of the defendants' state of mind at the time of their action. Simply
put, defendants no longer have to stand trial on a federal claim for damages
based on their unconstitutional actions unless a court has previously established
with sufficient clarity and particularity that such actions are indeed a
constitutional violation. In Hill v. McKinley, the Eighth Circuit applied this
immunity to deny Hill a federal cause of action, even though it is difficult to
imagine a justification for the failure to respect her privacy once she was
completely immobilized and no longer presented a threat to herself or anyone
else. This case is a clear example of the degree to which "qualified immunity"
is beginning to appear less "qualified" and more absolute.
1I. FACTS AND HOLDING

Law enforcement officers arrested plaintiff Robin Hill on August 17, 1996
for public intoxication as she walked home from a bar in Nevada, Iowa.' Hill
was highly intoxicated, registering a blood alcohol content of .306 g/dL more
than three hours after her arrest. When the police brought Hill to the jail,
defendants Michael Miller and Jennifer Holmes were on duty.4 The arresting
1. 311 F.3d 899 (8th Cir. 2002).
2. Id. at 901.
3. Id. Hill's blood alcohol content ("BAC") falls in the range generally regarded
as "severe intoxication." 13 ROSCOE N. GRAY & LOUISE J. GORDY, ATTORNEY'S
TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE § 134A.84 (3d ed. 2003).
4. Hill, 311 F.3d at 901.
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officers told Miller and Holmes that Hill had assaulted another officer.5 During
the booking process, Hill yelled and cursed at Miller and Holmes and was
generally uncooperative.6 When Holmes and Miller placed Hill in a holding cell,
she repeatedly pounded and kicked at the cell door
Holmes and Miller decided to place Hill in the jail's padded cell.' Although
Hill cooperated and did not resist the transfer, Holmes and Miller, in accordance
with written jail policy, ordered Hill to remove her clothing before entering the
padded cell.9 Holmes testified that she ordered Hill to disrobe and offered her
a paper gown before the transfer, but Hill refused it."0 Hill maintained that
Miller ordered her to remove her clothing, watched her while she disrobed, and
never offered her the gown." While in the padded cell, completely naked, Hill
alternated between periods of quiet and periods during which she screamed and
banged against the cell door. 2 Miller and Holmes later claimed that they became
worried that Hill would hurt herself if she were allowed to continue. 3
Defendant jail guards Tim Shoppe, Kevin McKinley, and Barry Thomas
and defendant jail matron Michelle Bahr arrived at the jail for the 11:00 p.m.
shift change, and spoke with Holmes and Miller regarding Hill.' 4 The
defendants decided to transfer Hill from the padded cell to a restraining board. 5
The jail officers claimed that they made the decision out of concern for Hill's
safety, and that they decided to move Hill right away because there were a
greater number of guards available during the shift change. 6 Jail policy required
the guards to make the transfer quickly and without regard to the prisoner's state
of dress.' 7 The jail officers did close the windows and food slots on nearby cells
before making the transfer.'
The officers then removed Hill from the padded cell, and walked her down
the hall and into another room.' 9 All six guards participated in the transfer of

5. Id. The case does not discuss the details of the alleged assault.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

10. Id. at 903.
11. Id. The court concluded that the jury was entitled to believe Hill's account.
Id.

12. Id. at 901.
13. Id.

14. Id. at 901-02.
15. Id. at 902.
16. Id.

17. Id. Thomas and McKinley also claimed that they had been injured in the past
while attempting to restrain a prisoner. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
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Hill, who was highly intoxicated and weighed approximately 110 pounds.20
Next, they strapped Hill face-down, spread-eagled, and completely naked to the
restraining board, where she remained for approximately three hours.2' Only
Holmes, Miller, Bahr, Shoppe, McKinley, and Thomas observed Hill while she
was naked,2 2 but Hill was completely unable to shift her body or cover herself in
any way while strapped to the restraining board. 23 At trial, the parties disagreed
regarding the amount of time that elapsed before one of the defendants finally
covered Hill. Bahr asserted that he covered Hill with a towel "almost
immediately," but Hill contended that she was not covered until her three hour
confinement on the board was nearly over.24 The court of appeals noted that the
jury's verdict indicated that it had credited Hill's account over that of Bahr.
Hill subsequently brought suit under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa26 against the jail officers
and Story County Sheriff Paul Fitzgerald, alleging that the defendants deprived
her of her Fourth Amendment right to privacy while she was in their custody.27
Hill also brought a claim under state law on a theory of "intrusion upon
seclusion. '28 In particular, Hill asserted that the defendants violated her right to
privacy by (1) requiring her to undress in the presence of a male guard, (2)
requiring her to walk down the jail hallway naked in the presence of male
guards, and (3) leaving her exposed on the restraining board in view of male
29

guards.

In their answer to Hill's complaint, the defendants raised the defense of
qualified immunity to the federal civil rights claim. 30 The district judge,
however, deferred ruling on the issue of qualified immunity until after the trial."'
32
The jury found for Hill on both counts, awarding $2,500 in damages.
Following the jury verdict, the district judge granted Sheriff Fitzgerald's claim
for qualified immunity and dismissed the suit against Bahr based on the statute
of limitations, but denied the remaining defendants' motions.33 On the question
of qualified immunity, the judge relied on Eighth Circuit precedent stating that
20. Id. at 910 (Hansen, J., dissenting).
21. Id. at 902.
22. Id.

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

28.
29.
30.

Id. at 904.
Id. at 903.
Id.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000); Hill, 311 F.3d at 899.
Hill, 311 F.3d at 901.
Id. at 905.
Id. at 903.
Id. at 901.

31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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the courts should take a "broad view" of what rights are "clearly established
law."34 The judge held that a reasonable officer should have known that leaving
Hill unclothed and uncovered while she was on the restraining board was not
constitutionally permissible, citing several cases "indicating that prison officials
must balance an inmate's right to privacy with the security needs of the
institution."" The court also awarded Hill's attorney fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
Section 1988 which grants trial judges discretion to award reasonable fees to the
prevailing party in an action under Section 1983.36
The defendants who remained in the suit appealed the district court's denial
of judgment as a matter of law, the jury's damage award on Hill's state tort
claims, the denial of qualified immunity, and the award of attorney fees. 37 A
panel of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals38 affirmed the denial of judgment
as a matter of law and the award of damages with respect to the state tort
claims.3 9 The panel, however, reversed the district court's denial of qualified
immunity on the Section 1983 claims, and consequently the award of attorney
fees under Section 1988 because it was "dependent on [the Section 1983]
claim."40
Considering the Section 1983 claim, the court first analyzed whether the
actions cited by Hill were actually constitutional violations. With respect to
Hill's first asserted constitutional violation, arising from the fact that the
defendants required Hill to disrobe in the presence of a male officer, the court
concluded that Hill's Fourth Amendment privacy rights were not violated.4 The
court also concluded that moving Hill down the hallway unclothed in the

34. Id. at 904. The district court cited Burnham v. Ianni, 119 F.3d 668, 677 (8th
Cir. 1997) (noting that the court takes a "broad view" of what constitutes clearly
established law).
35. Hill, 311 F.3d at 904 (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 529 (1979);
Chapman v. Nichols, 989 F.2d 393,395-97 (10th Cir. 1993); Jones v. Edwards, 770 F.2d
739, 741-42 (8th Cir. 1985)).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2000); Hill, 311 F.3d at 905.
37. Id. at 901.
38. The panel included Chief Judge Wollman and Judges Fagg and Hansen. Id. at
811.
39. Id. at 901.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 903. The Eighth Circuit panel cited three cases as precedent. Timm v.

Gunter, 917 F.2d 1093, 1102 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that opposite-sex surveillance
performed on the same basis as same-sex surveillance is reasonable where justified by
safety and equal employment concerns); Franklin v. Lockhart, 883 F.2d 654,656-57 (8th
Cir. 1989) (holding visual body cavity searches in view of other prisoners valid absent
evidence of exaggerated response to security concerns); Lee v. Downs, 641 F.2d 1117,
1120-21 (4th Cir. 1981) (upholding search of inmate's vagina in the presence of two
male guards).
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presence of male guards was not a violation of her privacy rights because the
transfer was ordinary practice, there were not enough female guards to effectuate
the transfer safely, and the transfer was "otherwise justified."4' 2 As to the third
alleged violation, however, the court sided with Hill and concluded that,
assuming Hill's version of events was correct, continuing to leave Hill's genitals
exposed after she had been secured to the table was not justified by the asserted
safety interest.43
Although the court of appeals found that Hill's privacy rights had in fact
been violated, two of the three panel members concluded that the defendants
were protected by qualified immunity. Citing, among other precedent, the
Supreme Court's decision in Saucier v. Katz,44 the court stated that while "a
precedential case need not be on all fours to clearly establish a constitutional
violation.., it must be sufficiently analogous to put a reasonable officer on
notice that his conduct was unconstitutional. 45 While the court agreed with the
general proposition that prison officials must balance security concerns with
privacy rights of detainees, it held that no prior cases had clearly established that
this specific behavior violated a detainee's Fourth Amendment rights.46
Judge Hansen dissented from the portion of the opinion holding that the
officers were protected by qualified immunity and reversing the award of
attorney fees under Section 1988. 47 Unlike the majority, Judge Hansen argued
that the constitutional violation began before the defendants strapped Hill to the
table while she was naked and left her there uncovered. In Judge Hansen's view,
the violation began when the defendants removed the naked Hill from the
padded cell and marched her down the hallway in the presence of male jail
guards.48 Judge Hansen distinguished the cases the majority cited, which dealt
with the rights of convicts, by pointing out that Hill was an arrestee who had
been convicted of nothing, and who therefore "fully retained her Fourth
Amendment right to privacy, subject only to such reasonable constraints as must
be imposed in the interest of safety or security. ,49
Judge Hansen wrote that the cases cited by the majority also made clear that
exposure of a detainee's genitals would constitute a violation of the Fourth
Amendment right to privacy when not "reasonably necessary in maintaining her

42. Hill, 311 F.3d at 903.
43. Id. at 904.
44. 533 U.S. 194 (2001). In Saucier,the Supreme Court stated that inquiry into
whether a right is clearly established "must be undertaken in light of the specific context
of the case, not as a broad general proposition." Id. at 201.
45. Hill, 311 F.3d at 904.
46. Id. at 904-05.
47. Id. at 907.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 908.
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otherwise legal detention."" ° He further wrote that, regardless of precedent, "a
common notion of ordinary human decency" should have prevented the officers
from invading Hill's privacy in such a manner."' According to Judge Hansen's
dissent, a balancing test that weighed the invasion into Hill's privacy against the
need for such actions should have provided notice that failure to cover Hill after
she had been restrained was indeed a constitutional violation.52
IRI. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The statute under which Hill brought suit, 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 provides
in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress ......
Section 1983 is derived from Section (a) of the Ku Klux Klan Act of April 20,
1871, which Congress enacted in an effort to give effect to the Fourteenth4
Amendment and to provide a remedy for violation of the rights it guaranteed.
Initially, however, Section 1983 was not an important factor in the
development of civil rights litigation. One treatise, collecting the work of
various researchers, found that between 1871 and 1920, only twenty-one cases

50. Id. at 910 (Hansen, J., dissenting) (quoting Fisher v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit
Auth., 690 F.2d 1133, 1142 (4th Cir. 1982)).
51. Id. at 910-11 (Hansen, J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 907 (Hansen, J., dissenting) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559
(1979)).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). The statute contains an exception that injunctive
relief shall not be granted against a judicial officer acting in his official capacity, unless
the judicial officer violated a declaratory decree or declaratory relief was not available.
Id.
54. Cristine Kuhn, Between Scylla and Charybdis: Can the Supreme Court Rescue
the Inimical Qualified Immunity Doctrine?, 43 DRAKE L. REV. 681, 683-84 (1995).
Although Section 1983 does not apply to deprivation of constitutional rights by federal
officials, the Supreme Court has effectively created a cause of action (the Bivens action)
against federal officials. Id. at 684 (citing Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed.
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971)).
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were decided under Section 1983. 5 Another fifty-three cases appear between
1951 and 1967.56

57
In 1961, however, the Supreme Court's decision in Monroe v. Pape
helped spur a dramatic rise in the use of Section 1983 in civil rights cases.5" In
Monroe, the Supreme Court helped clarify the application of Section 1983 to
actions under state law, holding that a plaintiff's allegation that an official acting
"under color of state authority" deprived the plaintiff of a right protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment was sufficient grounds for a Section 1983 claim,
whether or not the official actually acted in accordance with his or her authority
or abused it.59 In that case, the Court held that city police officers who were
authorized by state statute to conduct a search that the Court held unreasonable
were acting "under color of law" for purposes of Section 1983.60 The Court also
held that the plaintiff need not show that the official specifically intended to
deprive the plaintiff of a federal right.61 The Court stated that the statute should
be "read against the background of tort liability," including the mantra that "a
man [is] responsible for the natural consequences of his actions." 62 Ultimately,
Monroe appears to have breathed life into civil rights litigation under Section
1983. In 1980, Justice Powell noted in a dissenting opinion in Maine v.
Thiboutot9 that the number of civil rights actions brought under Section 1983
had increased dramatically; from 296 in 1961 (when Monroe was decided) to
13,113 in 1977." Other commentators, however, claim that Monroe was only
part of the cause of this explosion of litigation, and also credit such
developments as the Court's evolution toward applying the federal Bill of Rights
to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment.6 5
In time, however, the Supreme Court would interpret Section 1983 in a
manner that would diminish citizens' ability to hold public officials liable.
Section 1983 contains no provision extending immunity to law enforcement or
other public officials under any particular circumstances. The Supreme Court,
however, examined Section 1983 in Piersonv. Ray66 and concluded that when

55. CYRIL D. ROBINSON, LEGAL RIGHTS, DUTIES, AND LIABILITIES
JUSTICE PERSONNEL: HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 21 (2d ed. 1992).
56. Id.

OF CRIMINAL

57. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
58. ROBINSON, supra note 55, at 22 (citing Monroe, 365 U.S. at 167).
59. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 171 (emphasis added).

60. Id. at 187.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id.
Id.
448 U.S. 1 (1980).
Id. at 27 n.16 (Powell, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., Jack M. Beerman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation,
Fifty Years Later, 34 CONN. L. REv. 981, 1003 (2002).

66. 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
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Congress originally passed what would later become Section 1983, it intended
to leave intact immunities that existed at common law. 67 The Court then noted
that "[flew doctrines were more solidly established at common law than the
immunity of judges from liability for damages for acts committed within their
[e]ven when the judge is accused of acting maliciously
judicial jurisdiction ....
and corruptly. ' 68 With respect to law enforcement officers, however, the
common law had never granted absolute immunity, but instead granted a
' The Court held
qualified immunity based on "good faith and probable cause."69
that this immunity was to be applied to protect a law enforcement officer from
liability when "acting under a statute that he reasonably believed to be valid but
that was later held unconstitutional on its face or as applied."'
In the years following Pierson,however, the Supreme Court reformulated
the qualified immunity for public officials into a form that critics have alleged
"more resembles absolute immunity."' First, in Harlow v. Fitzgerald,72 the
Supreme Court eliminated the subjective "good faith" element of the test for
qualified immunity, holding that officials were immune from damage liability for
constitutional violations so long as their conduct "[did] not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known." 7 In Davis v. Scherer74 the Supreme Court further clarified its new
standard for determining the applicability of qualified immunity. The Court
disapproved of the "totality of circumstances" test used by the district court.7
The Court reiterated that it had forbidden all inquiry into the actual state of mind
of the officer who committed the violation in favor of a "wholly objective
standard," which the Court defined as the "reasonableness of [the officer's]
conduct as measured by reference to clearly established law. '76 In the Supreme
Court's view, "[n]o77other 'circumstances' [were] relevant to the issue of
qualified immunity."
The Court then added an element of particularity to the inquiry into whether
or not a right was "clearly established" for purposes of qualified immunity in

67. Id. at 554-55.
68. Id. at 553-54.
69. Id. at 557.
70. Id. at 555.
71. See, e.g., Stephen J. Shapiro, Public Official's QualifiedImmunity in Section
1983 Actions Under Harlow v. Fitzgerald and its Progeny: A CriticalAnalysis, 22 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 249, 252 (1989).
72. 457 U.S. 800 (1982). Harlowwas brought under the judicially created Bivens
cause of action instead of Section 1983. Id. at 805; see also supra note 54.
73. Harlow,457 U.S. at 818.
74. 468 U.S. 183 (1984).
75. Id. at 191.
76. Id. (quoting Harlow,457 U.S. at 818).
77. Id.
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Anderson v. Creighton." In Anderson, the court of appeals determined that the
defendant officials had violated the plaintiff's clearly established Fourth
Amendment right to be free from warrantless searches without probable cause.""
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that although the plaintiff's right to be free
from warrantless searches and seizures was clearly established, this right was not
sufficiently "particularized" to the actual circumstances of the case.8 ° In order
for a right to be "clearly established," the Court held, "The contours of the right
must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what
he is doing violates that right."'" Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, further
stated that "the objective (albeit fact-specific) question whether a reasonable
officer could have believed Anderson's warrantless search to be lawful, in light
of clearly established law and the information the searching officers possessed"
was the relevant inquiry, and that the subjective intent of the officer was
irrelevant.82
In part, the elimination of the subjective element of qualified immunity was
motivated by the desire to encourage speedy resolution of claims. Questions of
subjective state of mind prevented many defendants from obtaining summary
judgments, as there were often disputed questions of fact as to the violator's
motivation.83 As a result, the Supreme Court also determined that denials of
qualified immunity at pre-trial stages were immediately appealable; the
defendant need not wait until the outcome of the action.8 The Court stated that
qualified immunity "is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to
liability; and ...

it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go

to trial." 5
The Supreme Court had not yet finished its transformation of qualified
immunity. In Saucier v. Katz, 6 the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's
denial of qualified immunity to a defendant accused of using excessive force in
making an arrest.8 7 The district court and the court of appeals held that the law
governing excessive force was clearly established at the time of the plaintiff's
arrest.8 8 In reversing these decisions, the Supreme Court indicated that the

78. 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
79. Id. at 638.
80. Id. at 640.
81. Id.

82. Id. at 641.
83. Diana Hassel, Living a Lie: The Cost of QualifiedImmunity, 64 Mo. L. RsV.
123, 130 (1999).

84. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526-27 (1985).
85. Id. at 526.
86. 533 U.S. 194 (2001).

87. Id. at 200.
88. Id. at 199.
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qualified immunity inquiry should be conducted in two steps. The first step is
to determine whether the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,
show a constitutional violation. If no constitutional violation occurred based on
these facts, there is no need to proceed. 9 If a violation could be made out on the
alleged facts, however, the next step is to determine whether the right was clearly
established." In Saucier,the Court concluded that the defendant was entitled to
qualified immunity, even though the analysis of whether the force used was
excessive required its own subjective inquiry.9 The plaintiff argued that the
reasonableness inquiry used to determine whether the force the defendant used
was excessive rendered the Harlow analysis unnecessary.92 The Court rejected
this argument, stating, "The concern of the immunity inquiry is to acknowledge
that reasonable mistakes can be made as to the legal constraints on particular
police conduct. . . . If the officer's mistake as to what the law requires is
reasonable, however, the officer is entitled to the immunity defense." 93
In 2002, however, the Supreme Court reversed a grant of qualified
immunity in Hope v. Pelzer.94 In Hope, the plaintiff accused the defendant
official of violating the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishment.9 5 The plaintiff, a former prison inmate in Alabama, complained that
'
he had been handcuffed to a "hitching post"96
for refusing to work, for failing to
leave the prison bus with appropriate promptness, and for fighting with guards.
On one occasion, the plaintiff was required to stand handcuffed to the apparatus
for seven hours, shirtless in the sun, and was denied water.97 Although the court
of appeals found that the Eighth Amendment prohibited handcuffing the plaintiff
to the hitching post for purposes of punishment, it extended qualified immunity

89. Id. at 201. Critics of the Supreme Court's standard in Harlowhad asserted that
a district court could avoid the issue of whether or not an action was constitutional
altogether by simply issuing summary judgment in favor of the defendant based on
qualified immunity. Hence, violations of the Constitution would never become "clearly
established" for the purpose of future cases. See Shapiro, supranote 71, at 264-65. The
two step analysis required by the Supreme Court in Sauciershould remedy this problem
by requiring the court to determine the constitutionality of the action prior to any
determination of immunity.
90. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201.
91. Id. at 205.
92. Id.
93. Id. Hence, the Court appears to have found that it is possible to use
unreasonable force with the reasonable belief that the force is reasonable.
94. 536 U.S. 730 (2002).
95. Id. at 733.
96. According to the dissent, the proper term was "restraining bar." Id. at 749 n. 1
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 734-35.
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to the guards because the precedents relied on by the plaintiff were not
"materially similar" to the situation at hand.98
The Supreme Court reversed six to three. Writing for the majority, Justice
Stevens cited United States v. Lanier,99 in which the Supreme Court held that a
defendant in a criminal prosecution for violation of constitutional rights was
entitled to "fair warning" that his or her actions violated the Constitution. 0
According to Justice Stevens, the LanierCourt had also determined that the "fair
warning" standard was the same as the "clearly established" standard used to
determine qualified immunity.' Justice Stevens continued by saying, "[O]ur
opinion in Lanier ...makes clear that officials can still be on notice that their

conduct violates established law even in novel factual circumstances."' 2 Hence,
"the salient question that the Court of Appeals ought to have asked is whether
the state of the law in 1995 gave respondents fair warning that their alleged
treatment of Hope was unconstitutional."'0 3
The majority then analyzed three sources that gave the defendants notice.
The Court cited a Fifth Circuit case holding that handcuffing inmates to fences
and forcing them to stand for long periods of time was a violation of the Eighth
Amendment.' 4 The Court also cited a warning that the Department of Justice
had issued to the Alabama Department of Corrections that their use of the
hitching post was unconstitutional.'
Furthermore, the Court referred to dicta
from the Eleventh Circuit stating that denial of water to an inmate violated the
Eighth Amendment if done solely for the purpose of punishment, even though
such actions were permissible if done as a coercive measure to gain
compliance.'"
Although the Fifth Circuit's holding and the Alabama
Department of Justice's warning clearly established the plaintiff's right, the
Court made clear that the dicta from other cases in the circuit was also sufficient
to establish the right.0 7

98. Id. at 736.
99. 520 U.S. 259 (1997).
100. Id. at 270-71.
101. Hope, 536 U.S. at 739-40.

102. Id. at 741.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 742 (citing Gates v.Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1306 (5th Cir. 1974)). The
Court also noted that Fifth Circuit cases dated prior to 1981 were binding precedent in
the Eleventh Circuit. Id. (citing Bonner v. City of Pritchard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1211 (1 th
Cir. 1981)).
105. Id. at 741-42.

106. Id. at 743 (citing Ort v. White, 813 F.2d 318, 325-26 (1 th Cir. 1987)).
107. Id. ("Ort... gave fair warning to the respondents that their conduct crossed
the line of what is constitutionally permissible.").

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2003

11

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 68, Iss. 4 [2003], Art. 7
MISSOURI LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 68

IV. INSTANT DECISION

Because Hill was an appeal of a post-trial rejection of qualified immunity,

the Eighth Circuit was obligated to view the evidence in the light most favorable
to Hill.'0 8 The court noted that the instant case was unusual in that the
defendants raised qualified immunity in their answer to Hill's complaint, but did
not follow the usual practice of moving for summary judgment. 9 As a result,
the case went to trial on the merits, and the defendants therefore did not benefit
from their entitlement not to stand trial." 0 The court also noted, however, that
the defense of qualified immunity is not waived by failure to assert it prior
to trial.'
All three panel judges agreed that the guards violated Hill's Fourth
Amendment right to privacy, based on the jury's determination that Hill was left
on the restraining board for three hours face down, in a spread-eagle position
with her genitals exposed." 2 According to the majority, while safety and
security interests justify restraining an unruly prisoner, even when the prisoner
is a naked female and male guards are required to effectuate the restraint, those
interests no longer applied in this case once Hill was secured to the restraining
board."' The court was particularly troubled by the guard's failure to cover Hill
in light of the fact that Hill was unable to turn or otherwise shield herself."4
In spite of the clear constitutional violation involved, the court gave the
guards immunity from the Section 1983 claim, and reversed the district court's
award of attorney fees to Hill under Section 1988 because Hill could not

108. Hill v. McKinley, 311 F.3d 899, 902 (8th Cir. 2002) (citing Iacobucci v.
Boulter, 193 F.3d 14, 23 (1st Cir. 1999); Thompson v. Mahre, 110 F.3d 716, 721 (9th
Cir. 1997)).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. (citing Goff v. Bise, 173 F.3d at 1072).
112. Id. at 904; id. at 908-09 (Hansen, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 904.
114. Id. In fact, Hill's asserted damages in her state tort claim were not based on
emotional distress, but for injuries that she allegedly suffered while straining against the
restraining straps as a result of her embarrassment at being exposed. Id. at 906. The
panel affirmed this portion of the judgment, holding that a reasonable juror could have
concluded that it was the invasion of Hill's privacy and the "anger and anguish" that it
created that caused Hill to injure herself by straining against the straps. Id. at 907. In its
analysis of the state tort claim for invasion of privacy, the majority also held that there
was sufficient evidence to conclude that it was "unnecessary and unreasonable for the
defendants not to immediately cover [Hill] after they restrained her." Id. at 906. Judge
Wollman, writing for the majority, said that "[t]here is no question that being marched
down a hallway by several persons, including members of the opposite sex, and then
being strapped face-down to a board in a spread-eagle position, all while completely
naked, would be considered highly offensive by ordinary persons." Id.
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establish the second prong of the test, that the constitutional right that the
defendants violated was clearly established.'15 The majority noted that precedent
"need not be on all fours" to clearly establish a constitutional violation, but that
a case "must be sufficiently analogous to put a reasonable officer on notice that
his conduct was unconstitutional.""' 6 The court also relied on the Supreme
Court's statement in Hope that the "clearly established" requirement does not
demand that "the very action in question has previously been held unlawful; but
..in the light of preexisting law the unlawfulness must be apparent."" 7

The majority characterized the qualified immunity issue very narrowly.
According to the majority opinion, the court must find that "it was clearly
established in 1996 that a highly intoxicated, loud and violent prisoner could not
constitutionally be restrained naked outside the view of all but a small number
of guards."" 8 The majority held that the cases cited by the district court" 9 gave
a "general statement of the law" that the interests in maintaining security must
be balanced against the inmate's right to privacy, but they did not clearly
establish that the particular actions in question were unconstitutional.'
The
court characterized inmate privacy rights as existing within "very narrow zones,"
and noted that precedent allowed even the most invasive measures under certain
circumstances.' 2
In dissent, Judge Hansen characterized the qualified immunity issue more
broadly. Judge Hansen seized upon cases that the majority had relied upon in
holding that moving Hill down the hallway did not violate her constitutional
rights, and that no qualified immunity inquiry was therefore necessary."'
Although Lee v. Downs, 3 a Fourth Circuit case cited by the majority, 4 had
upheld viewing of naked prisoners by guards of the opposite sex, Judge Hansen

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. at 904-05.
Id. at 904 (citing Meloy v. Bachmeier, 302 F.3d 845, 849 (8th Cir. 2002)).
Id. (citing Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002)).
Id. at 905.
See supranote 35 and accompanying text.

120. Hill, 311 F.3d at 904.
121. Id. at 905. The court cited three cases to bolster this finding. Somers v.

Thurman, 109 F.3d 614, 619-22 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding no clearly established right to
be free of opposite-sex body cavity searches); Johnson v. Phelan, 69 F.3d 114, 146 (7th
Cir. 1995) (holding opposite-sex monitoring of naked prisoners permissible); Timm v.
Gunter, 917 F.2d 1093, 1101-02 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding pat down searches and
monitoring of inmates while naked by opposite-sex guards not violation of Fourth
Amendment).
122. See supratext accompanying notes 41-42.
123. 641 F.2d 1117 (4th Cir. 1981).
124. The majority cited Lee in support of its holding that requiring Hill to disrobe
in the presence of a male officer did not violate her constitutional rights. Hill, 311 F.3d

at 903.
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noted that it had also warned that "involuntary exposure of a detainee's genitals
in the presence of people of the other sex may, when not reasonably necessary,
constitute a violation of constitutionally protected rights.""12 Judge Hansen also
referred to other dicta from the Fourth Circuit that a pretrial detainee has a
"general right, constitutionally protected, not to be subjected by state action to
involuntary exposure in a state of nakedness to members of the opposite sex
unless the exposure was reasonablynecessaryin maintaining her otherwise legal
12 6
detention.'
In addition to Fourth Circuit precedent, Judge Hansen also cited the Eighth
Circuit's decision in Franklin v. Lockhart.2 ' In Lockhart, the court upheld
visual bodily cavity searches of inmates in administrative segregation in order to
combat the presence of weapons and drugs in the prison. 23 The Lockhartcourt,
however, limited its holding to the facts of the particular case, and noted that the
ruling would not give officers "carte blanche" or apply to "exaggerated"
responses.' 9 In Judge Hansen's view, the combined precedent from the Fourth
and Eighth Circuits was sufficient to establish "fair warning" that the guards had
crossed into territory forbidden by the Fourth Amendment right to privacy. 3
V. COMMENT
In certain circumstances, qualified immunity prevents courts from holding
government officials personally liable for their actions in violation of federal
constitutional rights. For that reason, the doctrine is not without its critics. In
particular, the Supreme Court's decision in Harlow eliminating the subjective
element of qualified immunity has spawned criticism that the qualified immunity
doctrine has become more and more like the absolute immunity afforded to
judges, rather than the more limited protection for law enforcement officers that
the Court originally imported from the common law.' 3' Furthermore, critics note
that the Court initially reasoned that Congress, in remaining silent on the issue
of immunity, intended for Section 1983 to retain the immunities available at
common law. 3" According to these critics, this decision should have constrained

125. Id. at 910 (Hansen, J., dissenting) (citing Lee, 641 F.2d at 1119).
126. Id. (Hansen, J., dissenting) (quoting Fisher v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit
Auth., 690 F.2d 1133, 1142 (4th Cir. 1982)).
127. 883 F.2d 654 (8th Cir. 1989); see also supranote 41 and accompanying text.
128. Franklin, 883 F.2d at 656.
129. Id. at 657.
130. Hill, 311 F.3d at 910 (Hansen, J., dissenting) (citing Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S.
730, 740 (2002)).
131. Shapiro, supranote 71, at 252; see also supranote 69 and accompanying text.
132. Shapiro, supranote 71, at 268; see also supranotes 66-70 and accompanying
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the Court to go no farther than the common law in granting such immunities.
Whether or not Congress intended to preserve immunities available at common
law, the commentators reason, the text of Section 1983 certainly did not grant
any new immunities. 3 a The Eighth Circuit's decision in Hill lends credence to
the criticisms of these commentators that qualified immunity is hardly
"qualified" at all.
Indeed, the departure from the original common law "good faith and
probable cause" defense is striking. Whether the defendants actually did neglect
to cover Hill is no longer an issue. The jury obviously believed that the
defendants failed to cover Hill, and the Eighth Circuit panel conceded that it was
entitled to do so.' 34 Under the common law, the defendant jail officers' "good
faith" would have been a relevant part of the determination of whether to allow
the defendants to stand trial or to cloak them with immunity from suit. ' As the
qualified immunity inquiry currently stands, the question of whether these
defendants failed to cover Hill out of mere indifference or outright depravity is
not to be considered in determining whether to insulate the officers from Section
1983 liability. This state of affairs is well beyond the immunity that the common
law envisioned, and Congress obviously did not anticipate such immunity
in 1871.136
37
Because the case law has removed the issue of malice from consideration,
the only question left to consider is whether the plaintiff's right is "clearly
established." Commentators have noted that despite efforts by the Supreme
Court to define some sort of standard to guide qualified immunity decisions, the
circuits, as well as judges within the same circuit, continue to quarrel over the
appropriate way to define the right that must be "clearly established."' 38 Some
judges define the issue in a very narrow, fact-specific fashion, placing an almost
impossible burden on Section 1983 plaintiffs to come up with a case that
sufficiently parallels the issue at hand. 39 Other judges place less emphasis on
analogous facts. Instead, they stress general principles laid out in cases not
factually analogous, then hold these general principles sufficient to clearly
establish the right asserted by the plaintiff for purposes of the qualified immunity
inquiry."' The panel's decision in Hill reflects this disagreement over how to
define the issue in qualified immunity analysis. While the dissent argued that the

133. Shapiro, supra note 71, at 268.
134. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
136. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
138. Charles R. Wilson, "Location, Location, Location ": Recent Developments
in the QualifiedImmunity Defense, 57 N.Y.U. ANN. SURv. AM. L. 445, 459 (2000).
139. Id.
140. Id.
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plaintiffs rights had been clearly established in a general sense, the majority
appears to have demanded precedent based on very similar facts, thus dooming
the plaintiff's claim.'4 '
The majority relied in part on Saucier, stating that the inquiry "must be
undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general
proposition."' 42 More recently in Hope, however, the Supreme Court reiterated
that defendants could violate clearly established constitutional rights "even in
novel factual circumstances."' 43 The majority in Hill also concedes that
precedent "need not be on all fours" so long as it is "sufficiently analogous to put
a reasonable officer on notice that his conduct was unconstitutional." One of the
bases on which the Supreme Court relied in Hope was precedent that had upheld
an action by law enforcement officers (denial of water to coerce a prisoner to
cooperate), but warned in dicta that in different circumstances the same action
would be unconstitutional (i.e., if the same action were taken to punish an
individual for past insubordination)."
As the dissent points out in Hill, previous cases from the Fourth Circuit
warn in dicta that subjecting an inmate to observation of his or her naked body
by members of the opposite sex constitutes a constitutional violation if not
reasonably necessary under the circumstances.' 4 Clearly, once Hill was so
tightly secured to a restraining board that she could not even move to shield her
body from view, she no longer presented a security risk. At first glance, Judge
Hansen's argument that Fourth Circuit precedent provides fair warning that such
actions are unconstitutional appears persuasive. However, Judge Hansen's
argument suffers from a serious flaw. In Hope, the Supreme Court, in reaching
the conclusion that a right was "clearly established," relied upon cases from the
same circuit as that from which the case had originated.' " In Hill, Judge Hansen
relies primarily on Fourth Circuit precedent to determine that a right is clearly
established in the Eighth Circuit. The Eighth Circuit precedent that Judge
Hansen cites, holding that visual body cavity searches are permissible if
reasonably necessary and not "exaggerated," is substantially less than a definitive
statement of the line between permissible activity and constitutional violation.'47
The majority, therefore, was probably correct in determining that there was not
enough authority within the circuitto clearly establish the plaintiff's rights. Even
though the defendants would have been hard pressed to explain why the security

141. See supranotes 118-121 and accompanying text.
142. Hill v. McKinley, 311 F.3d 899, 904 (2002) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533
U.S. 194, 201 (2001)).

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

See supranote 102 and accompanying text.
See supranotes 104-107 and accompanying
See supranotes 123-126 and accompanying
See supranotes 104-107 and accompanying
See supranotes 122-129 and accompanying
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of Hill and others mandated that Hill remain nude while restrained in a prone
position, they were spared this difficulty and relieved from the federal claim
against them.
VI. CONCLUSION
Hill v. McKinley illustrates the workings of qualified immunity, as well as
the deficiencies that inspire its critics to question whether qualified immunity is
just. In order to give effect to the concept that qualified immunity should
insulate a defendant even from standing trial, the Supreme Court has taken the
state of mind ,of the state actor out of the equation entirely. Regardless of
whether the individual defendant believed what he or she was doing was
constitutional, the plaintiff cannot take the defendant before a jury on a Section
1983 claim if the defendant convinces the court that there is no precedent clearly
establishing the unconstitutionality ofthe defendant's action. Indeed the fact that
conduct may be so blatantly unconstitutional that no officer has ever dared to
attempt it before may actually benefit the defendant who commits such conduct
in the context of a Section 1983 claim, as no "fair warning" precedent will exist
in such a case. As it now stands, the "qualified immunity" doctrine may cause
the practicing lawyer to seriously question whether Section 1983 is still useful
as a tool for vindication of constitutional rights absent "slam dunk" precedent
from the same circuit holding the same or highly similar conduct
unconstitutional. In the future, Congress may have to revisit qualified immunity
to determine whether the good faith, or lack thereof, of a law enforcement officer
is truly irrelevant when that officer violates a citizen's constitutional rights.
WILLIAM E. ROBERTS
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